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Public Perceptions about Equity & Fairness:
Siting Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal
Facilities in the U.S. and Hungary*
Anna Vari**
Background
Management of wastes is one of the most important environmental
problems for all societies that produce utility, industrial, medical or
other radioactive products. Solving the radioactive waste management
1
problem by democratic processes raises important social questions.
Research suggests that public concerns about the siting of a
hazardous facility are primarily grounded in distrust of institutions
charged with risk management and in equity, i.e., the distribution of
risks and benefits among those affected. 2 Studies focusing on siting a
high-level nuclear waste facility3 claim that it is essential to make
decisions in a morally sensitive way, leading to an equitable decision or
outcome. According to Young, 4 however, there is no generic concept
*
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1 Anna Vari, Ray Kemp & Jeryl M. Mumpower, Public Concerns about LLRW
Facility Siting: A Comparative Study, 22 J. Cross-Cult. Psych. 83 (1991); and E. A.
Rosa, R. E. Dunlap & M. E. Kraft, Bombs Away, Wastes Stay: The Disposal Legacy
and Challenge of Americas Nuclear Programs, in The Public and Nuclear Waste:
Citizens' Views of Repository Siting (R. E. Dunlap, M. E. Kraft & E. A. Rosa eds.
1993).
2 Roger E. Kasperson, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Community, Firm, and
Governmental Perspectives (1986) (CENTED reprint No. 55).
3 Paul R. Kleindorfer et al., Valuation and Assessment of Equity in the Siting of a
Nuclear Waste Repository (1988) (Rep. 88-67 Wharton Risk and Decision Processes
Center).
4 H. Peyton Young, Equityin Theoryand Practice (1994).
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of equity that applies to all situations. To understand the different ideas
of fairness, it seems promising to analyze how people see equity with
regard to the problem of siting radioactive waste facilities.
This paper focuses on the perceptions of fairness associated with the
siting of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LLRW and
ILRW) disposal facilities. The study investigates publicly expressed
responses to LLRW and ILRW disposal facility siting processes in the
U.S., specifically in New York, and Hungary. In New York, 100 letters
of protest and petitions by residents and environmental groups from
candidate siting areas were analyzed. In Hungary, texts of 24 semistructured interviews with residents, activists, and government officers
of the "short-listed" community and county were investigated.
Arguments associated with the fairness issue were collected from the
interviews and analyzed in terms of the conceptual framework
described below.
Competing Views of Fairness in Facility Siting
Recent studies show that different concepts of procedural fairness
and competing principles of fair distribution of benefits and burdens lie
at the heart of facility siting controversies. Hisschemoller and Midden
outline four distinct views regarding fair approaches to the siting of
hazardous facilities: technical, public participation, market and
distributive justice approaches. 5 In the case of the technical
approach, decision makers rely heavily on experts while public
participation in siting decisions is seen as undesirable. Alternatively, the
public participation approach emphasizes the importance of the
involvement and influence of all affected parties. The proponents of the
market approach suggest that host communities should be free to
negotiate a "fair price" for hosting a facility. The distributive justice
approach, however, implies that burdens and benefits should be spread
over the whole population as equally as possible.
Linnerooth-Bayer describes three views of a fair approach to siting
hazardous facilities: technical-hierarchical, individual-rights, and
5

Mathijs Hisschemoller & Cees J. H. Midden, Technological Risk, Policy

Theories and Public Perception in Connection with the Siting of Hazardous
Facilities,in Social Decision Methodology for Technological Projects 173 (Ch. Vlek
& G. Cvetkovich eds. 1989).
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distributive justice views. 6 The technical-hierarchicalapproach is
characterized by strict central government preemption of local
authority, limited public access, and a strong reliance on technical
criteria. The individual-rights approach shifts decision authority to
the affected communities, and implies public participation and
negotiation for compensation and incentives. In this case, local consent
is the most important siting criterion. Supporters of the distributive
justice approach strongly criticize the individual-rights approach
because it inevitably leads to siting facilities near disadvantaged
communities. Proponents of the distributive justice approach emphasize
various fairness criteria, including, but not restricted to, the

responsibilityand vulnerability of communities.
In a comparative study on the siting of low-level radioactive
disposal facilities, Vari et al. found that recent siting processes combine
the elements of multiple approaches. 7 As a result of combining several
tools and techniques, facility siting decisions are expected to be

accountable and supportable, efficient and legitimate. Vari et al.,
however, show how such criteria contradict or, at a minimum compete
with each other. 8 Therefore, it is inevitable that designers of the siting
processes decide on the relative importance of the competing criteria.
In addition to the siting approaches and the associated fairness
criteria, there are also competing distributive principles which can be
applied to site selection. 9 The principle of parity requires that all
parties be treated in some sense equally. In the case of facility siting,
this may mean that all communities (counties, states, etc.) get equal
shares of the burden. This can be implemented in various ways: the
waste can be physically divided among communities; an equal-chances
lottery can be organized to decide which community receives it; a
rotational arrangement can be implemented where everyone is
required to live near the facility some of the time; or compensation can
be paid to the host community with other communities dividing the
6 Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer, Fairness in Dealing with Transboundary Environmental
Risks, unpublished (1995).
7 Anna Vari, Jeryl L. Mumpower & Patricia Reagan-Cirincione, LLRW Disposal
Facility Siting: Successes and Failures in Six Countries (1994).

8

Id.

9
Young, supra note 4 and H. Peyton Young, Dividing the Indivisible (1994)
(IIASA Working Paper, WP-94-10).
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cost. A second distributive principle is proportionality, which means
that the burden is distributed in proportion to certain fairness criteria
(e.g., contribution to the problem, vulnerability, endowment). This
principle also can be implemented by the methods mentioned earlier,
including - proportional - physical division, lotteries, rotation,
compensation, etc. A third principle is priority where the burden, in
this case the facility, is allocated in whole to one community based on
selected criteria.
There is a general agreement in the literature that there is no single
10
morally correct way for allocating scarce resources or burdens.
According to Hisschemoller and Midden what people consider "just"
or "unjust" largely depends on the political system of which they are
part. 11 For example, France appears to be a country where siting
decisions can be characterized by the technical-hierarchical approach,
while in Sweden the public participation elements are emphasized.
Linnerooth-Bayer suggests that competing perceptions of fairness are
associated with plural world views defined primarily by group or social
belonging. 12 She claims that the technical-hierarchical, the individualrights and the distributive justice views are closely related to three
cultural biases revealed by cultural theorists, the hierarchist, the
individualist, and the egalitarian mentalities. 13 Rayner claims that the
fairness principles of parity, proportionality, and priority are compatible
14
with the egalitarian, hierarchist, and the individualist world views.
He suggests that in negotiation processes, the stakeholders' world views
be analyzed to understand their positions on equity.
The following analysis illustrates how the competing/conflicting
approaches to, and criteria and principles of fair facility siting manifest
themselves in two low-level radioactive waste management
controversies.
10 Young, supra note 4 and Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Benjamin Davy,
Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Faacility Siting in Central Europe: The Austrian Case
(IIASA 1994).
11 Hisschemoller & Midden, sypra note 5.
12 Linnerooth-Bayer , sypra note 6.
13 Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What
and Why? 119 Daedulus 41 (1991).
14 Stephen Rayner, A Conceptual Map of Human Values for Climate Change
Decision Making, Presented at the 1994 IPCC Working Group Workshop on Equity
and Social Considerations, Nairobi, Kenya.
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Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in New York State
Siting History

In the U.S., ocean dumping was the most preferred LLRW
management method until after 1960, when shallow land burial became
the most frequently used disposal technology. 15 During the 1960's
and early 1970's, six commercial and two governmental sites were
established. In the 1970's, three of the six sites, including a facility in
West Valley NY were closed because of leakage problems.
Consequently, three commercial sites (Barnwell SC, Beatty NV and
Richland WA) had to accept an increasing amount of waste. The
governors of the remaining states, South Carolina, Nevada and
Washington, indicated in the late 70's, that their states were not willing
to continue accepting waste from the rest of the country. In 1980,
Congress enacted the Federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
which made the states responsible for the disposal of LLRW produced
within their borders. The act expressed preferences for interstate
compacts that, if certified by Congress, could exclude the wastes of
states outside the compacts. However, there was slow progress in
forming interstate compacts because most state governments
anticipated strong public opposition to accepting wastes from other
states. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act Amendments of 1985
extended access to the existing sites until 1993.16
By 1993, seven interstate compacts had been formed. Compact
negotiations indicated that states favored reciprocal arrangements
where host states would be rotated. Some states, in spite of several
incentives associated with compacts, preferred to build facilities
exclusively for their own generators rather than to enter into compacts.
New York was one of the states that chose not to enter into an interstate
compact, but to follow the "New York alone" option. The primary
reason was that previous compact negotiations suggested that New
York would be selected to host a site without guaranteeing rotation of
host state responsibilities among the compact members.
15 Irvin L. White & Jack P. Spath, How are States Setting their Sites? 26(8)
Environment (1984).
16 Anna Vari & Klara Farago, From Open Debate to Position War: Siting a
Radioactive Waste Repository in Hungary, 11 Waste Management 173 (1991).
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Based on a comprehensive environmental impact assessment, in
December 1987, the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation issued regulations which define regulatory procedures and
performance objectives for permanent LLRW facilities, as well as
criteria for site and disposal method selection. The regulations
excluded certain areas such as densely populated cities, certain Federal
and State protected lands, and primary aquifers from further
consideration. Siting criteria were defined for various disposal
technologies including above-ground, below-ground, and underground
mined repositories. The New York LLRW Siting Commission prepared
plans to select one or more sites and disposal methods. According to
the plans, method and site selection would be carried out in parallel and
would be integrated to conduct an environmental impact assessment. In
December 1988, ten candidate regions were identified and by
September 1989, five potential sites were selected.
The announcement of the ten candidate areas and the five potential
sites was followed by substantial controversy. Due to repeated
demonstrations and violent incidents, in April 1990, the Governor of
New York recommended that the site selection activities be halted.
Waste generators, clearly frustrated over the lack of progress in
establishing a disposal facility, hired a private company to start
negotiations with the community of the Town of Ashford on siting the
disposal facility at the West Valley site in exchange for a $4.23 million
community benefits package. In 1991, the Ashford Town Board voted
to accept the benefits package. In response, ten West Valley residents
sued the Ashford Town Board requesting that the court vacate and
annul their resolution. 17 The petition against the Town was upheld,
but this was later overturned by the Appellate Division.
In May 1990, the New York legislature directed the New York
Energy Research and Development Authority to conduct a study on
the feasibility of on-site storage by waste generators for a minimum of
ten years, and on the economic viability of establishing a centralized
storage facility for Class A non-utility waste. The Energy Authority
initiated a process which includes a broad-based public participation
component. There has been a lot of public interest in the storage study
17 Town of Ashford Citizens, Petition to N.Y.Sup.Ct. (Cattaraugus Cnty. 1992).
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while many civil organizations expressed their preference for long-term
storage in contrast to permanent disposal.
Arguments on Fairness
During the New York process, hundreds of protest letters and
individual, citizen and environmental group petitions were received by
the Siting Commission, other state agencies, legislators, and the
Governor. We analyzed a random sample of 100 letters and petitions to
identify arguments associated with the fairness issue. The following are
examples of the most frequently expressed arguments.
Some writers argued that, as with the case of high-level radioactive
waste, the federal government should take responsibility for the
disposal of low-level waste, and find a technically optimal solution to
the problem, i.e., a technically superior site which would minimize the
risk of environmental contamination on the national level:
The state should be actively lobbying the federal
government to change directions in regard to siting, with
priority given to developing sites in areas of Western states
where there are virtually no people, little water, and a few
chances for major contamination in event of an accident.
(Letter of a Cortland County citizen)
Other writers, however, claimed that a share of disposal facilities
proportional to the volume of waste generatedwould be more fair:
After closure of the West Valley facility, the waste was
shipped for disposal in other states. In the late 1970's, those
states insisted that the disposal responsibility be shared more
equitably, and Congress responded with the Low-Level
Waste Policy Act of 1980. If the federal government has
determined that it is unjust to provide disproportionate
dumping in various states, thereby triggering the law, how
can the state justify disproportionate dumping in the
Chenango area which generates an insignificant amount of
waste. (Letter of a Chenango County citizen)
Why don't you place the dump where the waste is
made? It's their problem. (Letter of an Allegany County
citizen)
In accordance with the point-of-generation concept, residents of
neighboring Canadian cities also expressed their concerns about
transborder risks:
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Candidate area 5 is contained in a drainage basin that
flows northward across the border into Canada, thus
makingthe basin an international drainage basin.... Without
a doubt, this will adversely affect us, your Canadian
neighbors. (Letter of a citizen of Ontario)
Environmental groups also supported storing waste where it is
generated, emphasizing that this would minimize the risk added to
18
already existing risks:
Nuclear power plants are already radioactive dumps. It
is questionable whether a federal high-level radioactive waste
dump will ever be constructed. A "low-level" facility at a
nuclear power plant would add a comparatively small
percentage of activity to the waste already there. (Cortland
Citizens Against Radioactive Dumping 1990)
Residents of areas where nuclear power plants are located, however,
considered the above strategy extremely unfair. They emphasized that
risk should not be increased at places which have their share already:
We have been taking the risk of living near three nuclear
power plants, and storing the spent fuel rods, so that people
in other parts of the state can have electricity. We have taken
our share of risk, and refuse to take any more risk. (Letter of
an Oswego County citizen)
Due to the requirement for low population density, candidate sites
were located in rural communities. Writers living near these sites
frequently argue that the powerless rural population had been unfairly
targeted. This argument reflects an approach where economic and
social well-being are important to siting:
People who live in rural areas are always the ones called
upon to take waste produced in other areas. We are not
hillbillys who are nobody. This is our home and land.
(Letter of a Cortland County citizen)
Why can't we put a nuclear waste site dump in Albany?
Why can't we put it in the state official's back yard and
pollute their homes, family, animals, food and crops,
neighbors and lower the value of their homes and property?
(Letter of an Allegany County citizen)
Citizen and environmental groups emphasized that no facility
should be established in locations where there is no local support:
18 See Cortland Citizens Against Radioactive Dumping, Concerned Citizens of
Western New York, Don't Waste New York (1990) (Petition to New York State
Legislators).
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The Siting Commission has continually tried to force its
decisions on unwilling communities; this is totally
unacceptable. (Letter of a Cortland County activist)
Give localities more control over the siting, construction,
and operation of low-level radioactive waste facilities, ...
allow municipalities the authority to license, permit, approve
and, at the municipality's discretion, prohibit construction
or operation of a LLRW facility within the boundaries.
(Cortland Citizens Against Radioactive Dumping 1990)
On the other hand, some citizen groups were opposed to siting the
facility in volunteer communities, more specifically, at the West Valley
19
site. Some criticized the West Valley site as technically unsuitable:
The following characteristics of the [West Valley] site
would most likely preclude compliance with siting criteria
established by DEC pursuant to the 1986 Legislation...: (a)
persistent erosion and landsliding; (b) shallow depth to the
water table and significant fluctuations in the water table;
and (c) groundwater discharge to the surface. (Town of
Ashford Citizens 1992)
Others opposed the compensation offered by waste generators to
West Valley. They argued that communities volunteering to host
hazardous facilities are always the disadvantagedones:
It is not fair siting hazardous facilities in economically,
politically, and socially disadvantaged communities even if
they can be bought off. (Letter of a Cortland County
activist)
The benefits package is a bribe. (Letter of a Cortland
County citizen)
Management of Low- and Intermediate-Level Waste in Hungary
Siting history
In Hungary, the problem of LLRW and ILRW management
emerged in 1976, during the construction in Paks (Tolna County) of
the first nuclear power plant. It became clear that the LLRW and
ILRW could not be exported to the Soviet Union and the power station
had to dispose of the waste within the country.2 0 The first alternative
was to enlarge an existing below-ground repository established by the
19 See supra at note 17.
20 Vari & Farago, supra note 16.
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Ministry of Health for radioactive medical waste disposal. This option,
however, was not endorsed by the government and the nuclear power
station decided to establish a new below-ground disposal facility.
A legal and regulatory framework for establishing a new disposal
facility had never been elaborated. It was not clear which bodies were
responsible for regulation and licensing, and according to what rules. It
was necessary to obtain land use permission from county councils and a
series of permits from other authorities. Issuing the operating license
was the task of the Ministry of Health, but its decision could be highly
influenced by other governmental agencies.
The contractors of the nuclear power plant suggested building a
below-ground repository for the handling of LLRW and ILRW. Efforts
to find an appropriate site started in 1980. Criteria applied in site
selection included population density, distance from the power plant,
geological and hydrological conditions. As in most facility siting cases
under State Socialist rule, selection of an appropriate site was
considered to be the task of experts while the public had not been
informed about the problem until a decision was made.
In the first stage of site selection, eighteen alternatives were
identified, and from this set, the site near the village Magyaregregy
(Baranya County) was chosen in 1983. The residents of affected
communities including those of the short-listed village were not
notified about the process. For further testing it was necessary to get
the permission of the county council. This was supposed to be a routine
administrative procedure. However, the county council - based on the
negative opinion of a group of local experts on geological conditions
refused to give the permit.
In 1985, Ofalu, another village in Baranya County, inhabited
mostly by ethnic Germans, was suggested as a site by the experts of the
power station. Again, the residents of Ofalu and the nearby villages
were not informed. However, experts of the county again were involved
and opposed the site. They argued that the soil is not impermeable,
some wells are near and the region is seismically active. In spite of these
opinions, the county council issued a conditional permit for the testing.
In 1987, preparations for testing started and, shortly afterward,
news of the siting decision leaked out. Local residents began to oppose
-
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the siting and wanted to acquire more information. Representatives of
the power plant organized public meetings to reassure the public about
the safety of the facility. They distributed brochures containing
information about the disposal technology and the process of site
selection. However, this briefing failed to reassure the public. The
residents formed a committee which charged a group of experts
independent of the nuclear power plant with evaluating the results of
the previous geological tests. Having investigated the data, these experts
found the region inappropriate. Because the power station's experts and
the residents' experts could not reach a consensus, the county council
did not issue the land use permit, and in June 1988, the Ministry of
Health suspended the siting.
The government tried to get out of this stalemate by requesting a
committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to evaluate the
arguments of the opposing expert groups. In the spring of 1989, the
nuclear power plant offered financial compensation and some degree of
control over the operation of the facility, but local residents refused and
demonstrated against the siting. Finally, in June 1989, the committee
of the Academy of Sciences formulated its position in a rather
ambiguous manner: "the site is not inappropriate." Based on this
viewpoint, the Ministry of Health did not issue the license. As of 1994,
LLRW and ILRW are stored by the nuclear power plant.
Arguments on equity andfairness

To investigate attitudes toward the facility, the siting process and
potential compensation and incentives, a series of 24 semi-structured
interviews with key actors of the controversy, including local experts,
members of the residents' committee, and representatives of municipal
and county governments were conducted in the affected region.
Interviews were analyzed to identify arguments associated with fairness.
Examples for typical arguments related to fairness follow.
Several interviewees emphasized that a technically superior site had
to be selected by independent experts:
Experts who are independent of the Paks nuclear power
plant should choose the geologically most suitable site in the
country. (Official of the Baranya County government)
Others, however, argued that local acceptance should be the most
important criterion for site selection:
7 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 181 [Spring 1996]

It is the communities who should make the decision
whether they would accept the repository or not. (Local
government official)
Some local residents claimed that the waste disposal facility should be
established in Tolna County where the waste is generated:
The Paks nuclear power plant is located in Tolna county.
Residents of Paks have the jobs, Tolna county benefits from
the new roads, and the development of other infrastructure.
Why should Baranya County host the repository? (Member
of the residents' committee)
Some suggested disposing of the waste in an abandoned uranium mine
in Pecs (capital of Baranya county), where the additionalrisk of waste
disposal would be minimal:
Why don't they put the waste into the Pecs uranium
mine? It would cause less radiation than previous mining
activities? (Resident of the candidate area)
Residents of Pecs, however, vehemently opposed this idea. They
considered the city too vulnerable for a new hazardous facility:
It is unfair to ship the waste into a city where the background radiation is already higher than in most regions of
the country. (Resident of Pecs)
Some local residents opposed siting the facility in disadvantaged
communities inhabited by ethnic minorities:
Those in Budapest come here and want to put the
repository into our communities. They think because we are
far from the capital and have no power they can do anything
to us. (Resident of the candidate area)
The siting is an assault by the Hungarians at the ethnic
Germans. (Resident of the candidate area)
With regard to compensating a community for hosting the facility,
most interviewees held a negative opinion. The most frequent responses
were variations of the following:
"Human life cannot be compensated;" "The residents
must not accept compensation because the hazards will
influence future generations;" "Compensation is bribery;"
and "We cannot be bought."
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Analysis and Conclusions
We investigated fairness-related arguments concerning the siting of
LLRW and ILRW disposal facilities in two countries with highly
different economic, social, political, and cultural backgrounds. The
siting processes also differed in many respects, including the legal
framework, the procedures chosen for site and disposal method
selection, the interference of the government, the role of experts, and
the involvement of the public.
In the U.S., the federal government took a distributive justice
approach, emphasizing the criterion of responsibility when assigning the
burden for waste management to the individual states. The siting
process followed in New York can be characterized as a predominantly
hierarchical-technical approach where

-

at least initially

-

decisions

were based primarily on expert advices and the public played a very
limited role. Due to vehement public opposition, the process was
transformed into an individual-rights, voluntary siting form where
market mechanisms were tested. This approach, however, failed as well.
Finally, the very necessity and legitimacy of siting a permanent disposal
facility was questioned and long-term storage was advocated as a
preferred technology. Long-term storage of waste by generators is
actually a way of distributing the burden among multiple communities,
a special form of the distributive justice approach.
The Hungarian process can also be characterized as a predominantly
hierarchical-technical approach where the

-

state-owned -

nuclear

power plant tried to impose the facility on non-willing communities by
using expert opinions in the debate. Throughout the controversy,
experts of different stakeholders played a key role. Although some
attempts were made to offer compensation to the affected
communities, these came too late, and individual-rights approach did
not play a significant role in the siting process.
The collected data indicate a substantial overlap between fairnessrelated arguments in New York and Hungary. Criteria proposed for
fair site selection in both places were as follows:
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1. Technical efficiency:
• Minimal overall risk, i.e., choose the technically safest
site;
• Minimal additional risk, i.e., choose an already
contaminated- site.
2. Local consent:
• Preferences, i.e., those (organization, city, county,
country, etc.) who perceive that the facility results in a
larger benefit than cost should host it.
3. Criteria for distributive justice:
Contribution to the problem, i.e., those who generate
the waste should host the facility;
* Ecological vulnerability, i.e., those who have their
share in risks, should not be targeted; and
* Socio-economic vulnerability, i.e., those who are
economically-socially disadvantaged, should not be
targeted.
In New York letters, criteria associated with technical efficiency
(e.g., site characteristics, population density) were most frequently
mentioned, occuring in 29%. The next most important criterion was
the "contribution to the problem," cited by 17%. Local consent was
emphasized by 9% while ecological or socio-economic vulnerability
were mentioned by 7% of the respondents.
In .the Hungarian interviews, 61% of the respondents mentioned
technical criteria, while "contribution to the problem" was emphasized
by 33%. Criteria associated with vulnerability were mentioned by 13%,
and local consent was raised by 8% of the interviewees.
Although the investigated samples are not representative of the
affected population and the data are not entirely comparable, I believe
the data are sufficiently similar to enable us to draw a conclusion that
technical efficiency and contribution to the problem are the most
emphasized fairness criteria in both countries. In addition to the above
data, crucial events of the two case histories also indicate the increasing
importance of "contribution to the problem" as a siting criterion. In the
U.S., the 1980 federal LLRW Policy Act made each state responsible
for disposing of waste within its boundaries. Later, this provision of the
law was challenged, and responsibility for waste storage and disposal is
being placed on generators. According to Hungarian law, the Paks
nuclear power plant is responsible for handling its waste.
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The history of LLRW facility siting in the U.S. also indicates an
increasing interest in the proportional or equal distribution of the
burden as opposed to the priority rule. First, the 1980 federal LLRW
Policy Act reflected a preference for decentralizing LLRW disposal
among the states and establishing multiple regional LLRW facilities
across the nation rather than establishing one national facility. Second,
rotational arrangements in interstate compacts where responsibility for
waste management alternates among various states (e.g., California and
Arizona, South and North Carolina), are specific ways of equally
dividing the burden of a facility. Finally, in most host states, there has
been a strong public support for on-site storage which is essentially a
proportional distribution of waste storage facilities. In Hungary, the
issue was the disposal of the LLRW produced by one generator, the
only nuclear power plant of the country. Due to this fact and the small
amount of waste, only the priority principle was suggested.
As mentioned earlier, a specific mode for dividing the indivisible
negative impacts of the facility would be paying compensation to the
host community by the beneficiaries. 2 1 Several researchers, however,
argue that there are values which are very difficult or impossible to
compensate, including health, integrity, and cultural values. 22 Previous
research indicates that due to its catastrophic potential and threats to
future generations, the perceived risks of LLRW disposal are likely to
lead to resistance to compensation. 23 This assumption is supported by
the results of this study; except for a small number of communities,
public attitudes towards compensation were fairly negative in both the
U.S. and Hungary.
Further analysis of arguments, as well as experience in New York
and Hungary reveals possible contradictions among various fairness
criteria. Thus, it is unlikely that a siting exercise will simultaneously
meet all expectations. Massam has convincingly argued that the study
of ethics cannot be expected to provide formal rules which can be
applied to derive a correct choice for the location of a facility.2 4 The
Young, Dividing .... supra note 9.
22 Kleindorfer et al. supra note 3.
23 Judit Juhasz, Anna Vari & Janos Tolgyesi, Environmental Conflict and Political
21

Change: Public Perception on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in

Hungary,in Environment and Democratic Transition: Policy and Politics in Central
and Eastern Europe (A. Vari A. & P. Tamas eds. 1993); and Vari et al. supra note 7.
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legitimacy of a siting decision rather depends on the level of consensus
25
between the key stakeholders on the overall necessity of the facility,
the design of a fair siting process, and the fair distribution of risks and
benefits. Therefore, we recommend that, before planning a siting
process, the views of main actors regarding the principles and criteria
for fair processes and outcomes be explored, discussed, and a mutually
acceptable agreement be negotiated.

24 Bryan H. Massam, The Right Place (1993).
25 Michael Thompson, Unsiteability: What Should It Tell Us? 7 Risk 169 (1996).

